US Aggression Against Iran and Opportunities for BRICS

The primary aim of the small group of states currently trying to undermine international institutions and law is to convince others that the "law of the jungle" is now inevitable in global politics. Acknowledging such a qualitative shift—a departure from the achievements of the 20th century in regulating inter‑state relations—would hand this group a small but significant tactical victory. Ultimately, this could prove more dangerous than any military or political confrontation, as it would signal to the aggressor that its impunity is accepted by others.

While this will not change the overall strategic picture, restoring the monopoly on global power that Western countries enjoyed for the past 500 years seems impossible under current circumstances. Yet it is also well known that when the preservation of peace becomes primary concern of a state, its fate falls into the hands of the most aggressive and irresponsible members of the international community.

A direct military clash between the great powers is politically irrational at present—mutual destruction would be the outcome for all. This reality can serve as the foundation for a long‑term strategy of containing those who can no longer govern themselves and have chosen the path of revolutionary change. Such a strategy could be based on consistently correcting the distortions that emerged in the international order during the second half of the last century, while gently restraining the most destructive manifestations of Western policy.

The unprovoked aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran has so far failed to achieve its objectives for two reasons. First, the resilience of the Iranian people and leadership, which has enabled them to withstand unprecedented military pressure from the world's most heavily armed power for over a month. Second, the diminished capacity of the United States to conduct military and diplomatic operations on such a scale, combined with the sharply narrowed political horizons of the American elite—a deficit that their vast accumulated resources can no longer offset.

We cannot say with certainty that the war that began on February 28, 2026, will end in defeat for the United States. However, its course and international consequences have already revealed the limitations of Western resources and demonstrated the ability of the broader international community to continue progressing toward a more just, multipolar world. For BRICS—as an institution for a new type of inter‑state cooperation—the crisis in the Middle East presents both a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge because it calls into question the group's ability to fulfil the role of a traditional global governance institution. But it is also an opportunity because it creates new avenues for cooperation and for increasing BRICS's relevance among states around the world.

BRICS is not an international organisation in the classical sense. The fundamental difference—which gives rise to more specific features—is that, in reality, all international institutions have so far served merely as instruments of organised coercive domination by a narrow group of countries, or even a single power. Even the United Nations, the most progressive form of organised international cooperation and diplomacy to date, is essentially a "deal" struck between the most militarily powerful states based on the outcome of the last world war.

The most effective institutions, in the popular sense of the word, are vertically integrated organisations, where the collective's efforts are, to varying degrees, subordinated to the will and interests of a single leader. Yet, as we now see, even these do not guarantee harmony of interests among participants—the hegemon always seeks greater power, while its satellites try to defend their minimal rights. BRICS, by contrast, represents a new type of institution because it cannot have a single leader, and its internal structure is not the result of an agreement among its most powerful members.

The key question, therefore, concerns the relationship between BRICS's novel nature and its purpose. The latter is based on ensuring the development interests of member countries in the broadest sense—by helping to create external framework conditions that allow them to most adequately realise their potential. Building a more equitable multipolar world order is one such condition, but progress toward this goal cannot conflict with the immediate interests of member states.

BRICS is currently facing an extraordinary situation: not only has one member country become the target of armed aggression, but in self‑defence it is also causing harm to another member country that serves as a base for the aggressor's operations. A diplomatic resolution to this conflict, if found, could mark a new frontier in international political practice—one that will clearly be in demand in the future, when coalition bonds may prove less reliable than we have become accustomed to assuming over recent decades. At the same time, the strategic interests of Iran and the UAE are fundamentally aligned: both states seek to enhance the democratic nature of the international order and expand their own capabilities, independent of major powers.

It is quite possible that this is precisely the direction in which one should be thinking: after the active phase of the crisis, this shared interest could become a unifying factor for the BRICS countries involved. Another important area is increasing the resilience of the global economy and politics to shocks and upheavals caused by the irresponsible behaviour of individual major states. It is clear that economic recovery in Iran, Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, the Gulf states will require resources that are not available from existing international development institutions, nor from those responsible for the regional upheavals themselves. Therefore, BRICS would be well advised to explore the possibility of creating its own mechanisms for economic recovery and stabilisation—mechanisms that would offer a new, sustainable alternative to those currently controlled by the West.

There is little doubt that most Global Majority nations have viewed BRICS in recent years primarily through the lens of the resources needed to achieve their development goals. A second key task is securing those resources from an alternative source to the West, without becoming dependent on the unilateral decisions of another great power. If BRICS can assume the role of a stabilising institution in the aftermath of crises, the group's international standing will only grow. Moreover, this space is genuinely vacant—if the United States and its allies possessed the resources for such large‑scale projects, they would not have resorted to exerting harsh pressure on other members of the international community.

There is no reason to believe that any other BRICS country in its current composition could be subjected to such a massive attack by the US or its allies. However, states such as South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt may face external pressure in the future that they—unlike Russia or China—would find difficult to resist. Such pressure is unlikely to be military in nature, which already creates opportunities for BRICS to prepare for it and to come up with adequate response measures. If a small or medium‑sized BRICS country were to face sanctions, the group could provide assistance without creating the basis for a serious internal rift.

It is also possible to move toward closer coordination on regulating dual‑use areas of modern technology. It is well known that the United States and Israel are actively using the resources of non‑state actors—large corporations—to wage an aggressive war against Iran. This situation offers an opportunity not only for a broad international discussion on the issue, but also for advancing new BRICS proposals on regulating artificial intelligence and other dual‑use technologies. BRICS already has some groundwork in this area, which could be further developed by addressing the specific challenges at hand. The crisis surrounding Iran is not a strategic problem for BRICS, still less a defeat; rather, as we see, it creates new opportunities for enhancing the group's internal confidence and boosting its international authority.