BRICS and Russia–Africa: Two Agendas or One?

In early October 2026, Ghana announced its intention to join BRICS. As the country’s foreign minister, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, clarified, Accra is seeking partner-country status rather than full membership. President John Mahama nevertheless expects closer ties with BRICS to help Ghana expand trade, attract investment and develop domestic industry. Ghana has no intention of abandoning its traditional partners. On the contrary, its government hopes to benefit from a broader pool of potential investors.

This logic is hardly new. Back in 2011, as South Africa was joining BRIC, it saw participation in the grouping as an opportunity to expand its economic prospects, boost trade and attract investment. Fifteen years later, other African countries have similar expectations. Egypt and Ethiopia have already joined BRICS, while Nigeria and Uganda have become partner countries.

For Russia, this is a particularly important question. The third Russia–Africa Summit is currently taking place in Moscow. Its outcomes are expected to include an Action Plan for 2027–2029, a final declaration and a declaration on cooperation in artificial intelligence. The signing of more than 30 interdepartmental documents has also been announced. This raises a question about how the two frameworks relate to one another: Moscow is developing its own platform for engagement with African countries while also participating in BRICS, which is expanding cooperation with Africa as well. Their priorities largely overlap, ranging from food security and energy to infrastructure, digital technologies and skills development.

The need to bring the two platforms closer together was formally acknowledged in 2023. The declaration of the second Russia–Africa Summit called for stronger BRICS–Africa partnership. Less than a month later, the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg made cooperation with the African continent a central theme. Yet three years on, no concrete mechanism has emerged for linking the two frameworks. Perhaps the problem is not a lack of political will, but the way the task itself has been framed.

 

From a Continent-Wide Agenda to Sectoral Coalitions

The Russia–Africa Partnership Forum’s greatest strength is also its main limitation. The format makes it possible to maintain political dialogue with all the countries of the continent, but achieving comparable results with each of them is far more difficult.

Delegations from 48 African countries are represented at the summit in Moscow, including 22 countries represented at the level of heads of state. These figures are worth keeping in mind.

Some need supplies of grain and fertiliser; others are interested in building processing industries, developing energy systems or improving transport infrastructure. Political conditions also vary: some countries face armed conflicts, some have had their membership in the African Union suspended, and regional integration organizations are dealing with crises of their own.

Under these conditions, agreeing on a broad common agenda is relatively straightforward. Turning that agenda into projects that actually work is much harder. The Russia–Africa Action Plan for 2023–2026, adopted in St Petersburg, contains 181 provisions covering virtually every area of international cooperation. But the number of agreed areas of cooperation says little about its effectiveness unless each has identifiable implementing organizations, funding and measurable results.

These could bring together groups of countries facing similar needs and challenges. A successful project in one country could then provide a model for expansion to others. This approach would avoid the need to agree on a single solution for the entire continent every time, while preserving the summit’s role as an overarching political forum.

This is where BRICS could prove particularly useful.

 

Partners or Competitors?

As BRICS expands, it is creating something of a network of “anchor countries” in Africa. South Africa has a well-developed financial and industrial base; Egypt holds an important position in the transport system linking North Africa and the Middle East; and Ethiopia is one of East Africa’s key political centres. Nigeria and Uganda, which have gained partner-country status, offer opportunities to broaden dialogue with countries in West and East Africa.

Yet expectations should not be overstated. Neither BRICS membership nor partner-country status automatically makes a state an advocate for Russian interests. Moreover, Russian businesses compete in African markets with companies from China, India and other members of the grouping.

China has a more developed infrastructure for trade and investment cooperation with Africa. Since May 2026, it has extended zero import tariffs to all 53 African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations. India is also actively expanding its economic ties with the continent. According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, bilateral trade reached US$93 billion in the preceding year, while total Indian investment in Africa exceeded US$80 billion. New Delhi places particular emphasis on pharmaceuticals, digital technologies, skills training and infrastructure projects.

For African countries participating in BRICS, such competition is more of an advantage: it allows them to choose among different offers.

Competition, however, does not preclude cooperation. Interests may converge around the development of transport corridors, the creation of production chains or the training of specialists for industries in which BRICS companies already operate in African markets. What matters is that cooperation grows out of a specific project rather than an abstract commitment to stronger multilateral ties.

 

One Initiative, Several Frameworks       

Food security is a useful example. Russia wants to expand exports of grain, fertilisers and agricultural technologies, while many African countries seek to diversify supplies, reduce exposure to global price fluctuations and modernize their agricultural sectors. At the forum, Vladimir Putin said that more than 40 African countries receive Russian grain and fertilisers, and that Russia exported 13 million tonnes of agricultural products to Africa between January and September 2026.

BRICS is discussing the creation of a grain exchange platform. In September 2026, its members also agreed to establish AGRIN, a network for cooperation on agricultural technologies, seed resources and information exchange. These initiatives are at different stages of development and do not yet constitute a single functioning mechanism, but a practical foundation is gradually taking shape. In February 2026, the St. Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange and the Egyptian Mercantile Exchange signed a memorandum of understanding. Around the same time, a specialised BRICS working group met in Cairo with the participation of HSE University to discuss competition in food markets.

Why not consider this field as a potential pilot project linking the Russia–Africa agenda with BRICS instruments?

A similar approach could be applied to education and vocational training. Russia is already training specialists for nuclear-energy projects in Egypt and expanding cooperation with Ethiopia in the nuclear sector. BRICS has its own education, research and technology mechanisms, including the BRICS Network University and the BRICS Technical and Vocational Education and Training Cooperation Alliance. These could help extend successful training programmes to other interested countries, although the formal terms of participation would still need to be agreed on.

Financing is, of course, more complicated. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) finances infrastructure projects in Africa, but membership in the grouping does not automatically provide access to its resources. Moreover, the bank has suspended new operations in Russia since March 2022, and the terms on which Russian companies could participate in NDB-financed projects abroad require separate consideration. The NDB should therefore not yet be treated as a universal financing instrument for Russia–Africa cooperation.

Cross-border payments could provide another practical link between the two agendas. At the Russia–Africa summit, there were renewed calls to increase settlements in national currencies, strengthen correspondent banking relationships and use alternative financial messaging systems, including the Financial Messaging System of the Bank of Russia and the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS). BRICS is also discussing tools for cross-border payments but connecting them with Russia–Africa initiatives will require separate agreements.

What Should Be Done with the Two Agendas?

This raises a natural question: does Russia need to develop separate Africa cooperation programmes for the Russia–Africa Summit and for BRICS?

A more sensible approach would seem to work from a single set of priority projects while adapting the tools used to advance them to the capabilities of each platform.

This arrangement would not require creating another international body. It would be more useful to include several cross-cutting sectoral initiatives in the Action Plan, identifying potential participating countries, responsible organisations and expected outcomes. As projects progress, new partners could be given the opportunity to join, including countries that do not currently participate in BRICS.

Ultimately, BRICS may offer the greatest value to Russia’s Africa policy by providing a new way to organize cooperation that already exists. A shift towards sectoral coalitions built around clearly defined groups of interested countries could make Russian initiatives in Africa more concrete and easier to replicate. If a successful project can expand beyond its initial group of participants, that would be more convincing evidence of Russia’s growing partnership with the “continent of the future” than a longer list of agreed areas for cooperation.