The vanguard of the World majority is the new identity of the BRICS with an unchanged basis
The current Russian presidency of the BRICS falls at a crucial period in the development of the international system - a period of struggle between emerging multipolarity and the West's attempts to maintain its hegemony in world affairs - and the largest transformation of the association itself in its history. In this regard, Russia faces a double task: to adapt the BRICS to the new composition, to ensure its effectiveness in the face of a doubling of the number of its member countries; and at the same time to strengthen the role of the BRICS in global governance as the vanguard represented by developing non-Western countries of the World majority and thereby bring closer the formation of a non-hegemonic multipolar world order. This task is very difficult, requiring remarkable diplomatic skills and endurance from Russia as chairman.
First, the BRICS members have become even more diverse in their domestic and foreign policy orientations, and the Association has become even less homogeneous. After the 2023 expansion, it is no longer a group of mainly large non-Western economies, but a structure that includes representatives of different regions and civilisations of the world, including regional rivals (Iran – Saudi Arabia). For the first time, BRICS includes both official allies of the United States (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt) and its official opponents (Russia, Iran). Some of the new BRICS members do not yet fully understand what they can gain from participating in the Association and what added value they can bring to it. The diversity of national interests of the member countries has increased significantly within the ten.
Perhaps the only principle that unites the BRICS nations in their expanded format is the shared vision of a just multipolar world order, free from global hegemony, and the understanding that all member countries, regardless of their size, military and economic power, or internal political regime, are fully sovereign and committed to pursuing independent foreign policies and not subordinating themselves to others. Therefore, all efforts to strengthen this unity and maintain deep cooperation within the group should be based on this fundamental principle.
Second, Russia faces the challenging task of combining broadening and deepening within BRICS, a feat that very few international organisations have managed. Traditionally, one has precluded the other. (The European Union, whose large-scale enlargement in 2004 led to the stagnation of the integration process and disrupted progress towards a qualitatively new level of integration, is a good example). However, BRICS has a unique advantage due to its informal nature. Unlike classical international organisations or integration projects, BRICS allows for flexible geometry and does not require the same depth of participation of all member states in all cooperation projects. In the new BRICS format, "coalitions of interests" are acceptable, allowing some countries to engage more deeply in certain issues than others, provided no BRICS member objects.
Third, strengthening the group's role in global governance and promoting a multipolar world order should be done without resorting to confrontation with the United States and the wider West. The confrontational policies of the United States towards Russia, China and Iran, and the formation of blocs in Europe, Asia and (less successfully) the Middle East to oppose them, have become one of the central elements of contemporary international relations. The temptation is to respond in kind. Moreover, as the target of a brutal hybrid war orchestrated by the collective West, with no end in sight, Russia would undoubtedly like to cooperate with as many countries as possible on an anti-Western basis.
But such a policy would be counterproductive. The US is seeking a new bipolarity in which the West, united under Washington's leadership, would be confronted by a coalition of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and possibly Venezuela, Cuba and a few other countries led by Beijing. At the same time, the vast majority of non-Western countries would maintain at least a neutral position. The US believes it can prevail in such a confrontation, largely because of the potential of its many satellites, and the bloc confrontation itself would provide the West with bloc discipline and create an internal core and meaning for US foreign policy.
Moreover, since BRICS is neither a military nor an economic bloc, and since it consists of a large number of countries with different types of domestic political regimes and foreign policy orientations, it is not a suitable format for bloc confrontation, and the vast majority of member countries do not want to participate in it. The BRICS is not capable of becoming a non-Western analogue of the G7 in the conventional sense. Moreover, since the majority of BRICS countries do not really want to get involved in a confrontation with the United States (as well as with Russia or China) and have a negative attitude towards the global polarisation promoted by Washington, the creation of such an anti-G7 is hardly possible in principle. The willingness of US satellites to sacrifice their own interests and development for the sake of 'all-Western' interests (i.e. for the sake of US interests and Western hegemony in world affairs) is a great exception in contemporary international relations.
The mission of BRICS – and all its member countries agree on this – is not to contribute to the polarisation of the world but to reduce it, to promote an interconnected and interdependent international system on a non-aligned and non-hegemonic basis, in which states would not be faced with the stark choice of joining one antagonistic bloc or another, and in which common problems and priorities such as economic development and poverty alleviation, food and water security, the fight against international terrorism would be given priority. Therefore, the work within the BRICS to build a new world order, a new system of global governance, and to strengthen the role of the association in it, should be creative rather than confrontational, by building a new ecosystem of political and economic relations among the countries of the Association, as well as between the BRICS and other countries of the World Majority.
The cooperation that the BRICS countries are building with each other and with like-minded countries on bilateral relations and the global agenda, the infrastructure that is emerging as a result of this cooperation, and the position that the BRICS countries are collectively taking on global issues is much more effective in weakening Western hegemony and the effectiveness of its confrontational policies than the formation of an antiWestern bloc. What is emerging is not a bloc confrontation between a few blocs and the neutral position of the majority, as Washington seeks, but rather the formation of a new system of international economic and political relations within the framework of the entire World Majority and without the West, bypassing it. As a result, sooner or later the West will be forced to face a dilemma: either to abandon the policy of confrontation and attempts to build a world order based on its hegemony, i.e. to become a normal participant in the international system, or to be marginalised.
The Evolution of BRICS: A New Identity with an Unchanged Basis
In the 16 years of its existence, BRICS has undergone a remarkable evolution, significantly changing and acquiring an essentially new identity. In the 2000s, it was formed (still with four members) as an informal association of the four largest developing countries, the fast-growing emerging markets, as they were then called. This is how BRIC appeared at its first summit in Ekaterinburg in 2009, with an agenda focused on economic issues. The entry of South Africa in 2011, whose economy is many times smaller than that of the other BRICS countries, has already started the process of transforming the association into the most prestigious and representative forum of the non-Western world as a whole, representing the interests of developing countries in global governance. Although South Africa joined the BRICS from Africa, it did so primarily because it was the continent's largest economy.
From 2011 to 2022, the BRICS countries have dedicated themselves to deepening and institutionalising cooperation. Although the Association has remained informal, it has created full-fledged international organisations and development institutions such as the New Development Bank. BRICS cooperation has expanded far beyond the economic sphere and now rests on three pillars: economic and financial, political and security, and humanitarian, covering a wide range of issues and involving a variety of activities at different levels. For example, in addition to the summit in Kazan, some 250 events of various levels and focus are planned under the Russian chairmanship in 2024. BRICS has developed more institutionalised cooperation on some issues, such as the BRICS Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. In terms of breadth and depth of cooperation, BRICS has become far superior to many traditional international organisations.
At the same time, the BRICS countries began to coordinate their approaches and speak from similar positions on global governance and many current issues of world politics and security, increasingly expressing the views of the East and the South. This was expressed in the declarations of the annual BRICS summits, as well as in the statements of many other events held within the framework of the Association, and was reflected in the need to reform global governance, to strengthen the position of developing countries in it, and to reinforce the world order based on international law and the central role of the UN. And as the overall global governance deficit grew as a result of Western policies that were unwilling to share power in regulatory institutions despite the objective change in the balance of power in the world, and that exacerbated global problems with increasingly confrontational policies towards China and Russia, the BRICS voice on global governance issues became more and more attractive to more and more countries.
It became increasingly clear that BRICS was representing the voice of a majority of non-Western countries in the world, and that participation in BRICS offered both prestige and many opportunities to promote national interests. At the same time, unlike Western structures, BRICS lacks a hegemon and is based on the sovereign equality of states, respect for civilizational diversity and genuine multilateralism, where decisions are not imposed by a hegemon but jointly developed and adopted by consensus.
This success of the BRICS, on the one hand, and the emergence of a specific global context characterised by a sharp increase in the demand for autonomy and subjectivity on the part of many countries of the world, their desire to create a fairer world order and their unwillingness to become hostages of a new great power struggle, prepared the ground for the expansion of the BRICS in 2023. In 2023, some twenty applications for membership were submitted, and the process continued in 2024.
It is no coincidence that such a sharp increase in interest in unification on the part of non-Western countries occurred precisely in the period after 2022, when the USA simultaneously launched a 'hybrid war' against Russia in order to inflict a strategic defeat on it and began a systemic struggle against China, proclaiming it the main strategic rival and the greatest threat, in order to contain its development, weaken it and subordinate it to the US position. This global confrontation, with the explicit aim of maintaining the hegemonic position of the USA in the international system, has spread to all regions of the world (Washington seeks to weaken the positions of China and Russia wherever possible) and has become almost total in terms of the instruments used (sanctions and trade restrictions, pressure on Russia's and China's partners around the world, information warfare, consolidation of anti-Russian and anti-Chinese blocs in Europe and Asia, proxy war against Russia through Ukraine and preparation of Taiwan for a similar role, etc.).
It demonstrated to the whole world the injustice of the model of world order promoted by the USA and its satellites, showing that their goal is not law and order and development for all, but their own hegemony and their own development at the expense of others, the preservation of the de facto neo-colonial model, where the development of the chosen is achieved at the expense of the exploitation and inhibition of the development of others. It has become clear that the need to fight China, on which the US has a strong consensus, is primarily dictated by the fact that it has become too strong and is already challenging American primacy in a number of areas; that the root cause of the war in Ukraine and the confrontation between Russia and the West was the latter's categorical refusal to take into account Moscow's security interests, its commitment to dominance in Europe, and its desire to force Russia to eventually accept a subordinate and peripheral position in the European security system. The West's position on the Gaza war of 2023–2024 underlined the extent of its hypocrisy on issues of values and world order and showed once again that it is not interested in international law or universal values, which it has repeatedly violated, but in its own dominance.
Moreover, this confrontation has dramatically increased the global governance deficit, exacerbated many transnational challenges and threats, and complicated the development task of many countries around the world. Traditional institutions of global economic and political governance (G20, UN Security Council) have either been paralysed or, like the G7 or the OECD, turned into confrontation mechanisms and are no longer capable of producing global public goods.
Global cooperation on common challenges such as international terrorism has weakened dramatically. Trade restrictions imposed by the West, unilateral (i.e. illegal) primary and especially secondary sanctions, the desire to shift technological and production chains from China to countries loyal to the West, the illegal seizure of Russian property in the form of freezing state and private assets and talk of confiscating them, attempts to administratively regulate world energy prices (the so-called 'price cap' on Russian oil), – all this has affected the development of the world economy, which has only just begun to recover from the shock of the global pandemic, and consequently the development of many developing countries, increasing threats such as food shortages, inflation and lack of money for development. The new arms race launched by the West and the increase in military spending have exacerbated the lack of resources for development.
The result was a qualitative change in the international environment that the West clearly did not expect. Many nonWestern countries, on the one hand, refused to join the confrontation between the USA and its satellites against Russia and China: they did not join the sanctions and began to declare them illegal, especially with regard to secondary sanctions, i.e. the West's attempts to force third countries to comply with its will regarding their relations with the targets of primary sanctions by threatening them with repressive measures. Instead, these non-Western countries maintained or even expanded cooperation with Russia and China. Second, these countries began to significantly strengthen their own agency in world affairs and to assert their desire to participate in decision-making and global governance. It became clear that such participation was essential for their own development and security (they cannot rely on external actors, especially the West, to protect their interests) and to avoid becoming expendable or "collateral damage" in the ongoing struggle between the great powers. Third, non-Western countries have become more proactive in their pursuit of a multipolar and equitable world order. They are actively supporting global governance reform, recognising that such a reformed world order would enhance their security and improve their development prospects.
All of this has shaped the Global Majority: a diverse group of non-Western countries that prioritise sovereignty, seek greater agency in global affairs, advocate a multipolar world and more equitable global governance in favour of developing countries, and do not support the West's confrontational stance towards Russia and China. However, the Global Majority countries generally do not seek direct opposition to the United States and its allies, nor do they seek to form opposing blocs. Instead, they seek to create a global environment in which Western policies are less damaging and divisive, and to create the conditions for the West to abandon confrontation and move towards constructive engagement within a multipolar framework.
It was this aspiration that led the majority of the world's countries to the BRICS. They did not see it as an alternative bloc to the West, but as a prototype of the world order they would like to see on a global scale, as well as an institution that would help strengthen the security and development of its member countries, promote their interests and a favourable global agenda. Moreover, due to its informal nature, it is much easier to join BRICS than to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, for example. However, the effect in terms of prestige and increased influence in global governance is significant.
The decisions taken at the historic summit in Johannesburg marked a significant shift in the identity of BRICS – from a group of the largest developing economies to a representative vanguard of the global majority and a catalyst for shaping a new world order and a new system of global governance. With the addition of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Ethiopia, BRICS now encompasses countries with diverse domestic and foreign policy orientations, representing different regions and civilisations. These diverse nations are united by a common desire to enhance their role in global affairs, respect for each other's sovereignty and civilizational diversity, and a vision of a desirable world order at the global level and a more equitable global governance that favours developing countries.
Comprising several major powers without a hegemon, including rivals who, despite competing on regional and practical issues, cooperate on global issues and share a vision of a just world order, and including countries of different civilisations that respect each other's civilizational distinctiveness, BRICS is seen as a prototype of multipolarity. It is a structure that unites the Global South and the Global East on the principles of equality, sovereignty and mutual respect.
The "quantitative" importance of the BRICS in world affairs has also increased significantly. It now accounts for a larger share of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms than the G7 (35.6% versus 30.3%), and the gap is expected to widen. According to Yuriy Ushakov, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation, "BRICS accounts for more than a third of the world's dry land (36%), 45% of the world's population (3.6 billion), over 40% of total oil production and about a quarter of global merchandise exports".
At the same time, the expansion has not changed the fundamental nature of BRICS as an informal, non-bloc group of states without a hegemon. There is no intention, now or in the future, to have a single leader within BRICS, similar to NATO or the G7, who would impose discipline on other members and push them to achieve collective goals. Each BRICS country, old or new, pursues its own national interests in practical matters related to the global economy and politics, which do not always coincide. This reality limits the ability to reach and, crucially, implement collective decisions, an ability that is typically more streamlined within leadership-based institutions. Moreover, following the expansion of BRICS, there are now at least three pairs of regional rivals within the Group: Iran – Saudi Arabia and Egypt – Ethiopia, in addition to the existing China – India relationship.
Therefore, following the expansion of BRICS, it is essential to intensify efforts to reform global governance and promote a more equitable world order, while recognising the inherent limitations of the Group's nature.
- First, it is unrealistic to expect the BRICS to create international financial institutions and instruments with influence comparable to those controlled by the West, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
- Second, it is unlikely that BRICS would endorse confrontational or coercive measures against other members of the international community, such as the imposition of BRICS sanctions or similar G7-style restrictions. It is unrealistic to expect BRICS to act as a battering ram aimed at undermining the influence of the United States and Europe on the global stage. On the other hand, it is no coincidence that Western powers are suspicious of others' intentions, which they often regard as potentially revolutionary or revisionist: even purely innocent actions can pose a threat to Western hegemony, given its modern fragility. Therefore, there is no need to pressure our BRICS partners into actions that could be more destructive for the West – they will naturally become so.
- Third, BRICS is unlikely to take on major global tasks that the West either cannot solve or is unwilling to address because of its self-interest. However, BRICS will be able to create specific mechanisms to address development challenges such as poverty, hunger, environmental issues, crime, terrorism, information security and artificial intelligence, offering alternative approaches and solutions that differ from those of the West.
- Fourth, the BRICS countries should not be expected to achieve results on issues where their national interests diverge for objective reasons related to the achievement of their primary development goals. BRICS was created and is expanding to further strengthen the capabilities of its members, not to weaken them.
Thus, the interest shown in BRICS by the countries of the Global Majority, the risk of global division and the deficit of global governance caused by the West's desire to maintain its hegemony through confrontation and bloc separation, as well as the new identity that BRICS has acquired through expansion and the limitations associated with its ability to implement collective action, – all this underlines the need for BRICS to position itself as the vanguard of the Global Majority and an example of correct power relations in a multipolar world, as a concentrated expression of a multipolar and multi-civilizational world order, and to strengthen its role in global governance. To achieve this, it is necessary to increase the share of global issues on the BRICS agenda, while maintaining the priority of relations among member states.
In the area of global economic governance, BRICS should prioritise increasing the use of national currencies and building an infrastructure of trade and economic relations between states, including investment and technological cooperation, that is less vulnerable to repressive measures by the West and not dependent on its financial system. This includes developing direct relations between BRICS banks, creating mechanisms for pooling conditional foreign exchange reserves, and establishing an independent payment system using technologies such as digital currencies and block chain. It is crucial to continue to emphasise that the use of economic interdependence as a weapon of geopolitical struggle and the imposition of unilateral sanctions and restrictive measures outside the framework of the UN Security Council for foreign policy purposes is unacceptable.
In the area of politics and security, it is essential to maintain cooperation on common challenges and threats such as international terrorism, extremism and organised crime. This is particularly important as these threats have been re-energised by the West's confrontational policies, which have undermined global cooperation against them. In addition, it is necessary to promote the idea that international security and great power relations depend to a large extent on whether participants in international affairs adhere to the principle of the indivisibility of security and refrain from enhancing their own security at the expense of others. These principles should guide the creation of regional security arrangements.
In terms of global governance, there is a need to seek rapid reform of the UN Security Council by increasing the representation of developing countries from Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America. In addition, developing countries should have greater representation in the secretariats of major global organisations and greater rights and influence in sectoral economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO.
Finally, especially after enlargement, the BRICS should promote globally the idea of harmony among civilisations, as articulated in one form or another by Russia and China and supported by all other BRICS countries. The group should emphasise, by its own example and through joint statements, the importance of recognising and respecting the diversity of civilisations in the world, promoting peaceful coexistence and cooperation among different civilisations without attempts to impose change on each other, and recognising that no model of development or value system is or will be universally applicable.