New Delhi Outcomes: When Compromise Means More Than It Seems

So, today the final fanfare died down: Prime Minister Modi met with the remaining scheduled leaders – representatives of partner countries or heads of international organizations – and then everyone returned home. The BRICS summit has concluded, although India's chairship in the group itself is not yet over. Its results must be assessed by analyzing not only the main document – the New-Delhi Declaration – but also the external environment. After all, if you recall, a number of observers noted (I imagine Western leaders were even praying for such an outcome) that a final document might not be forthcoming. After all, the May meeting of foreign ministers ended precisely like that: the world saw only a statement from the chairman, which signaled the impossibility at that time of reconciling the positions of the two new BRICS members: Iran and the UAE.

It was clearly demonstrated that the value of BRICS for each member extends far beyond basic political and diplomatic arrangements and signaled economic potential. And this is the main foreign policy outcome of the recent summit.

Global governance, values and geopolitics

But what about the content? Following all the press conferences and official statements by leaders, the main emphasis, of course, is on strengthening the role of the Global South, the need for global governance reforms (citing Modi's "pyramid of privilege"), a compromise formulation condemning wars and aggression and the inadmissibility of attacks on civilian infrastructure (especially nuclear) without mentioning specific conflicts, as well as countering unilateral illegitimate sanctions... And this is indeed important, but I'd like to start with something else.

From the very beginning of BRICS's emergence, Western observers have pointed out that, unlike the G7, which is bound together by fundamental values of global responsibility, democracy, and market economy, BRICS is too heterogeneous as a grouping. Also that the positions of each member will eventually push them to different sides of the barricades, leading to the eventual collapse of the group.

However, time has shown that the declared shared values of the vertically integrated G7 do not lend the group any overall weight, nor do their decisions have any depth or global significance.

The central political theme of the summit was, indeed, once again, the reform of global governance and global institutions. The BRICS Declaration again called for making the UN, IMF, and World Bank more representative and more in line with the actual distribution of economic and political weight in the world.

On the one hand, this set of objectives is indeed standard. On the other hand, it is interesting that BRICS did not limit itself to the usual approaches and statements.

Indeed, when it comes to UN Security Council reform, there was no breakthrough. The issue of the need to "play a more significant role in the UN, including its Security Council" has been raised for years. Perhaps, on the contrary, after expansion, South Africa's own position has faded from focus, as with the increase in BRICS African members, the emphasis shifted to the implementation of the Sirte and Ezulwini consensus, and greater depth has not emerged.

However, BRICS countries have developed far more detailed demands for all parameters of the required reform, without delving into the most politically complex issue of the Security Council : this includes a detailed approach to the composition of the Secretariat, the role of women, the work of the General Assembly, and so on. Assessments, perhaps also with a little more depth, have also been retained regarding the problems of reforming the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

However, Prime Minister Modi's calls for UN Security Council reform negotiations to be tied to specific deadlines and clear results remained more wishful thinking than a real call to action. Even if the BRICS countries, particularly Russia and China, agree to this, convincing their Western counterparts of the urgency of such measures will be much more difficult, if not impossible.

One of the key compromises this time around was indeed the paragraphs within the section on International and Regional Peace and Security . The inability to adopt a unified position on the Middle East conflict led to rather general, but no less important, formulations.

Paragraph 22 of the Declaration calls for "the lifting of such illegal measures that undermine international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter," while the differences between Iran and the UAE were smoothed over by a statement of deep concern over the "continuing escalation of tensions in the Middle East/West Asia region" and a call to "exercise maximum restraint and refrain from actions that could further aggravate the situation," taking into account their respective national positions.

And yes, it’s the economy, stupid

The economic agenda, predictably, focused on reducing vulnerability to external shocks. While no final results have been reached yet, the leaders agreed to support further work on a common payment system, the broader use of national currencies in mutual trade and investment, and the further strengthening of the role of the New Development Bank. However, when discussing strengthening the role of the NDB, it's important to keep in mind that it's not enough to focus on the capabilities of this single mechanism.

Supply chain sustainability and critical minerals occupy a special place. The declaration emphasizes the need to create reliable, diversified, and equitable supply chains for raw materials needed for a just energy transition and high-tech industries. This topic is truly promising, as it links industrial policy, energy security, the development of green technologies, and the fight for added value. This is not only and not primarily about extraction, but rather about the right of countries possessing such resources to develop further processing within their own countries, countering the tendency to remain mere raw material appendages in global supply chains.

The casuistry of paragraph 89 was somewhat confusing, although one would like to hope that the phrase about gratitude to India “for its leadership role in 2026 in fulfilling the instructions given by the leaders in 2025, by successfully leading the work on agreeing on the “BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy until 2030” rather signifies the possibility of the earliest possible actual adoption of this strategy, rather than an admission of the lack of results, since it was the framework of the first two EPSs (until 2020 and 2025) that provided the foundation for the development of closer and more productive trade and economic relations between the BRICS countries.

What does it bring to common people of the BRICS? If realized – quite a lot. Establishing payment systems and getting rid of this extra mediator, as one colleague once counted, would spare up to 40% of money used when travelling to the other BRICS country. Initiatives aimed at issues of local enterprises or farmers (like that of the Global Forum on Farmers' Rights in Seed Systems or Jaipur Consensus to study the establishment of an Invoice Discounting Mechanism for BRICS members) by default are able to increase their capacity and offer possible avenues for development. Over hundred of NDB projects to enhance infrastructure capacity while not supplementing, but complementing other international finances for development, has already brought change to local communities. Such enumeration could continue.

What’s next?

After the initial euphoria over BRICS demonstrating its maturity and ability to maintain unity, the question inevitably arises: "What’s next?"

The 140 points do indeed contain all the details on all three pillars of BRICS cooperation, but the question of how quickly each point will be implemented is far from trivial. After all, it is the short path between an initiative and its practical implementation that demonstrates the club's true significance and its commitment to achieving its best.

Starting in January 2027, the BRICS presidency will pass to China, which, I am confident, will approach its role with no less responsibility. But even before January, I hope the enthusiasm of our countries' leaders will not fade, and by the end of this year, we will see the current euphoria give way to calm and rational work on implementing all agreed positions: from settlements in national currencies and the payment system to further developing joint approaches to AI and digital infrastructure, from deepening the role of the NDB to the practical implementation of the New Investment Platform, from the BRICS Comprehensive Early Warning System for Disease Risks to the BRICS Network of Centers of Excellence in Agroecology and Regenerative Agriculture to ensure climate resilience and increase productivity. Each mechanism in the 45-page document could be analyzed separately, but that is unnecessary now. Moreover, we will certainly monitor the dynamics of development and the fulfillment of obligations within the framework of the Index, agreed upon by the BTTC (BRICS Think-Tanks Council) back in 2020, used in Monitoring of the Effectiveness of BRICS Cooperation, regularly prepared by the BRICS-Russia Expert Council.

In any case, while the New Delhi Summit didn’t show a breakthrough in creating a new global financial system, nor did it resolve geopolitical differences within the group itself.

BRICS is not about symbolic disagreement, but rather a platform for searching for practical alternatives – albeit still cautious, heterogeneous, and far from ideal, but nonetheless proposals for new rules. This is a transition from those for whom the rules are written by others to those who propose these rules themselves.