Postmortem: Poisoned Universe

Perhaps we are no longer alive, and anything unfolding is merely the collective phantom pain of a world that has gone completely mad. Rules? What rules? International law has effectively ceased to exist. For 35 years since the collapse of the Yalta‑Potsdam system, there has been a persistent effort to replace that framework with a set of rules convenient for the key global elites. But the very concept of a "rules‑based order"—once invented by the West—has now been simply thrown into the trash. "Values": the word has long been used as its own antithesis. It is precisely for this reason that less "advanced" communities, such as the BRICS countries, often feel compelled to add qualifiers—"traditional," "national," or "historical"—when they speak of values. Yet even there, the degree to which old, traditional, or historical values are embraced depends heavily on the influence of global media over minds of local populations, especially the younger generation. We have entered the age of post‑truth, post‑humanity, and anti‑values. For the first time, the most powerful player feels no need to disguise its true intentions with fine words or to invent justifications for its actions. Bombing and destroying women and children is permissible simply because some are allowed to do anything—because the few voices raised against them will not be heard, because it is more convenient. And also because it demonstrates that Caesar can do anything, and any act, no matter how vile, becomes sacred by virtue of having been performed by Caesar, regardless of the depth of moral descent. As what stands for morality? If the strongest desires it, any action is justified.
Trump is not an aberration; Trump is the natural development of the modern world order. The Cartesian "I think, therefore I am" has entered a new phase, and Trump has perfected the formulation: "I can destroy, and I am frank about my aims, therefore I am Supreme Power and the centre of the world order."

Yet what casts doubt on the reality of this world is not so much the conduct of the United States (and Israel), but the silence of the other nations. The victim strikes back, but hopes for mercy. All the rest—equally potential victims in the near or more distant future—remain silent, or nearly so. International institutions, sovereign states: it is as if they are not merely obsolete, but have ceased to exist beyond any possibility of repair. What’s more, the grouping that won timid but growing hopes of the Global Majority—and of the "non‑elite" segments of Western populations— BRICS – is also keeping silent.

 

Is the Patient More Alive Than Dead?

None of this suggests that BRICS is dead—or rather that it is more moribund than the United Nations or any other international mechanism. On the contrary, BRICS still appears to retain more room for maneuver and more opportunities than most. Any reasonably competent BRICSologist will rightly note that the group is not a military alliance; it has no treaty obligation to defend its members, much less to mount a collective military and political response to an overzealous aggressor.

The group's work has not stalled. The Indian Chairship continues—with varying degrees of intensity—to advance the four key priorities it has set. Discussions are ongoing about BRICS's potential to contribute to the economic and social development of its members and partner countries, and about its positive influence on global processes.

What is somewhat more disquieting is the proliferation of talk-shop as opposed to substance. Western-trained experts are quick to offer neat alphabetical schemes to describe the work of BRICS: 4C, 5A, 7I, and so on.[1] Meanwhile real substance and non-declarative movement ahead are often forgotten with such elegant labels. Moreover, as long as we continue to be confined within the frameworks imposed on us, even the best initiatives will remain limited in their capacity and outcome.

The turn toward non‑Western theories of international relations is often presented as a breakthrough—as the banner of the Global Majority, or, if one prefers, the Global South and East. On the one hand, the aim is genuinely noble: to study and systematise everything advanced by scholars and researchers from outside the United States, Europe, or the Anglo‑Saxon part of the Pacific. On the other hand, the terminology itself reinforces a sense of secondariness—the implication that these currents are derivative, defined always in relation to Western concepts. This stereotype is further entrenched by the repeated assertion that BRICS is non-Western rather than anti‑Western.

And again, I do not mean to suggest this is untrue: BRICS is genuinely not anti‑Western or anti‑systemic. Many of us—including this author—have emphasised its cooperative, co-optative and positive nature, its quality as a soft alternative to the existing order, a movement not against but for, albeit with its own special features. In this, one might even recall the long‑forgotten Soviet slogan about building socialism with a human face. But it is precisely this paradigm that imposes limits on its followers. A recent conversation with Anil Sooklal—former South Africa's BRICS Sherpa and now South Africa's High Commissioner to India[2]—pushed me toward a final recognition of the inadequacy of this construct. He drew attention to the flawed logic of defining BRICS by what it is not: "not the West." The point is not that we agree with our opponents' thesis that BRICS is a threat to the West, a menace to the established order of the "geriatric" developed countries, meaning that Trump and his circle are right to view BRICS as a destabilising factor and a threat. That is not the case, and never will be—at least in the worldview of the BRICS nations. (We cannot, unfortunately or fortunately, be held responsible for the psychological traits of our Western partners, and therefore cannot dictate how they should perceive the world.) But something else matters: we should not take the West as a concept to be our reference point. BRICS can and must operate without relying on the legacy of Western countries. Their achievements may, in some areas, be applicable and serve as an example; in others, they only lead to disaster and degradation. Accordingly, nothing proposed by the West can be regarded as a fixed, final solution. Just as the slogan "catch up and surpass the West" became a worn‑out, dead‑end road in the Soviet Union, so too today the concept of "non‑Western" group fails to provide a foundation for building a different, more just world. The path forward has many splits. BRICS must choose its own way—neither as adversary nor rival to the West or anyone else; neither defining itself in opposition, nor orienting itself toward paradigms alien to its own experience; and certainly not demeaning itself by treating its own ideas and approaches as somehow inferior.

 

Playing by the Rules Where No Rules are Applied

Over the 20 years of its existence—many experts and officials cite this timeframe, though the first summit took place only in 2009—BRICS can indeed boast an impressive list of achievements. To claim that BRICS has nothing concrete to show the world is a temptation only for those who take a superficial view of contemporary international relations, or who want to deliberately distort the existing picture. It would be untrue to say BRICS has achieved nothing. Yet there is still room for improvement.

For all the shared accomplishments and genuinely remarkable results—not least the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB)—the bank's activities remain severely constrained by the opportunities the current financial and economic system affords it. True, it doesn't include any Western countries. True, it does not require borrowing countries to comply with any kind of political conditionalities that institutions like the World Bank or the IMF impose, the ones that can devastate a recipient's economy and social fabric. But the NDB's contribution remains a drop in the ocean of Western‑dominated rules and institutions. This is not merely a matter of scale—its capital is indeed incomparable to the accumulated wealth of Western‑centric institutions such as the World Bank, though that situation will change over time, and in the NDB's favour. The deeper issue lies elsewhere: the NDB cannot act independently. Every action it takes is strictly circumscribed by the framework imposed on any institution operating within the existing Western‑centric system. In that sense, the NDB remains subordinate to it.

Similarly, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), created more than a decade ago, has yet to offer a viable escape from Western financial structures for any transition economy experiencing serious turbulence. It merely continues to "successfully complete" yet another round of testing.

Moreover, if BRICS is to bring to life the Russian Chairship's highly promising initiative for a joint platform for economic growth, it must move beyond these systemic constraints and begin to formulate the fundamental rules of a new ecosystem—one not grounded in the rules and idols of the old, so‑called Bretton Woods system. This is all the more urgent given that the West has long become highly selective in its adherence to those rules, observing them only when they still work in its favour.

It is finally time to undertake a thorough examination of the theoretical, ideological, cultural, and civilisational approaches that each BRICS country brings to international cooperation. The long‑running discussions about the need to identify shared civilisational values should be elevated to one of the key objectives of the third pillar of BRICS cooperation. This means working, at the official level, to articulate a unified value platform—and not confining the effort to sporadic meetings of marginal philosophers from individual BRICS countries. It must become a systematic endeavour, one capable of giving rise to a paradigm for BRICS not as "non‑Western," but as an independent entity in its own right.

At the same time, BRICS cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the potentially devastating problems the group is facing now, hoping for a self-resolving scenario. No one is suggesting it is easy to continue discussions—in an expanded format—not only on general issues of sustainability, development, the SDGs, and the like, but also on the specific problems of peace, global, and regional security, in the context of an ongoing conflict rooted from US and Israeli aggression against Iran. While the Ukrainian issue, whatever the nuances of each member's position were, had little impact on BRICS's work (since it affected only one party), Iran's strikes on US bases in the Gulf—including strikes on a fellow BRICS member, the UAE, that have caused damage to civilian infrastructure—pose a far greater challenge. Periodic border clashes between two founding members, India and China, have also had little effect on BRICS; they remained on the bilateral agenda and did not impinge on the broader shared interests that both countries advance within the BRICS framework.

Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. The current conflict touches on vital aspects of survival for Iran as a country. The position of the UAE is no less complex: the presence of US military bases and a number of strategically important American institutions on its territory is seen in Iran’s logic as aims for its strikes, in turn bringing tragedy to fellow Gulf economies and its peoples.

In these circumstances, can discussion be confined to the general socio‑economic and humanitarian aspects of cooperation among the BRICS nations? It seems that a failure to respond to the ongoing military and political crisis will undermine the credibility of BRICS, which is widely seen as a pillar of an emerging, more just world order. Let me repeat once again, BRICS is not a military alliance; the approaches and principles of the aggressive NATO bloc are alien to all BRICS nations, and BRICS membership does not entail any obligation to provide armed protection to fellow members. At the same time BRICS cannot simply ignore the current conflict.

What options might be proposed to the BRICS countries—or, more specifically, to the Indian Chairship, which has the misfortune of leading the process not merely within an expanded group (as was the case for Russia in 2024 and Brazil in 2025), but at a moment that demands bolder solutions in response to a critical mass of accumulated problems, especially against the backdrop of an intensifying international conflicts?

First, a bolder conversation on global governance is needed—not at the level of previously adopted statements about giving a greater voice to the countries of the Global South, but one that yields concrete proposals and steps to overcome a situation when the strongest bully continues to use force as a claim of being right. This requires not only a complex discussion on UN reform, not only the development of a common position on the Board of Peace, but also a clearly defined and operational enforcement mechanism within a unified system of rights and responsibilities. It is essential to explore the nuances of global governance reform in depth, without limiting ourselves to cosmetic adjustments to the UN, including its Security Council.

Second—and no less important—is an in‑depth discussion within the existing framework of meetings of national security advisers, representatives of foreign policy planning departments, and other agencies responsible for ensuring national security and formulating foreign policy approaches to a rapidly evolving situation. Perhaps it would be useful to reach an agreement on the joint use of BRICS armed forces to ensure humanitarian protection for the populations of BRICS countries—with the possibility of extending this assistance to other nations of the Global Majority, should such a request be received. This could include organising a clear and efficient system for providing international humanitarian aid, involving combined task forces from BRICS countries (naval, air forces, etc.) to conduct joint humanitarian operations, whether in the aftermath of natural and man‑made disasters, epidemics, or other emergencies. To be clear: this is not about joint military exercises, but solely about ensuring humanitarian protection and delivering aid.

Finally, we cannot underestimate the importance of allocating funds to projects essential for the survival of the populations of the BRICS nations and partner countries—with potential expansion to all countries of the Global Majority. The New Development Bank is engaged in long‑term infrastructure development projects, but its shortcomings lie not only in the aforementioned integration into an alien and outdated financial and economic system; the Bank also remains a profit-oriented commercial enterprise. It is necessary to agree on the creation of a BRICS Humanitarian Fund, based on different principles and endowed with the mandate, capacity, and sufficient resources to respond promptly to any situation leading to a humanitarian catastrophe in member states, partner countries, and any countries or territories requesting such assistance. Not all humanitarian aid can be delivered through the BRICS armed forces, so it is essential to develop clear algorithms and mechanisms for providing emergency medical, food, energy, and other assistance to civilian populations through such a humanitarian fund in the event of armed conflict, natural or man‑made disaster, or other emergencies that could lead to mass death and suffering in the affected countries.

Perhaps the same fund could also provide financing for socially significant projects within the framework of Track II mechanisms in the BRICS countries—whether through the Civil Council, the Youth Council, or other structures involved in implementing humanitarian initiatives.

Incidentally, this would once again demonstrate that BRICS differs fundamentally from the institutions and mechanisms of the old world not by 360 degrees, as Annalena Baerbock might put it, but by a genuine 180 degrees. It would preserve and enhance its authority, and would restore people's hope that they will not be left defenceless in the face of any serious threat.

Time for talking or half-way measures is long overdue. Its high time for actions. Not only the BRICS countries themselves, but the world as a whole has no interest in seeing BRICS remembered as one of international projects that showed promise but failed to live up to it. We have the power to prevent such an outcome. But this requires courage and a broad and profound perspective from those who believe in life but are not afraid of death.