Trade Policy of Russia and Its EAEU Partners as a Factor in Shaping BRICS Trade Regime
Over the past decades, regional trade agreements (RTAs) have evolved from a "supplement" to the multilateral trading system into one of the main instruments of foreign economic policy for many countries. According to the WTO's statistical database (RTA‑IS), as of February 2026, 380 RTAs were in force and operational worldwide. This rapid growth reflects not only the persistent difficulties in developing the multilateral trading system but also intensifying competition for regional markets and the increasing participation of companies in regional value chains.
Russia is pursuing a proactive policy of engagement with BRICS, promoting the development of the BRICS+ strategy by involving other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries in cooperation within this format. This includes the growing use of RTAs. However, not all BRICS nations pursue similar policies when it comes to concluding RTAs.
A study of BRICS countries' approaches to concluding RTAs in various forms—the most common being free trade agreements (FTAs)—has revealed significant differences in their attitudes toward this instrument. While RTAs are generally viewed positively as an important component of trade policy, there are clear divergences in objectives, partner selection criteria, and assessments of FTA effectiveness. Among other reasons, these differences explain the lack of a common goal among the BRICS countries to form a free trade area within the group. Another contributing factor is the concern of some countries about China's economic dominance. As a result of this combination of factors, a common free trade area cannot yet be established within BRICS.
For Russia, BRICS is currently a priority format for developing multilateral economic relations. At the same time, RTAs are a preferred modern instrument for expanding foreign economic relations for most countries. This creates a certain tension between the priority Russia places on developing its foreign economic relations within BRICS and the inability to use the most popular trade policy tool—a common FTA—within the group.
A partial solution to this contradiction could be an active policy by Russia and its EAEU partners to conclude bilateral FTAs with those individual BRICS countries that are most prepared for such arrangements. The fact that a single BRICS‑wide free trade area cannot yet be established does not prevent individual members from concluding multiple bilateral FTAs among themselves. In this context, BRICS as a group could serve as a platform for developing more active bilateral cooperation among its members by fostering a network of FTAs.
Russia's recent foreign economic strategy and those of its EAEU partners have largely focused on using such instruments, thereby creating the fundamental preconditions for unlocking BRICS's potential in a new capacity. Russia, as part of the EAEU, is already participating in free trade agreements with three BRICS nations.
The agreement with the UAE was signed in June 2025, with Indonesia in December 2025, while the FTA with Iran entered into force in May 2025, following the expiry of the interim agreement signed in 2019. These arrangements represent a significant step forward in developing trade regimes with these countries.
For example, the UAE will reduce its average import duty rate from 5% to 0.6%. Duty‑free treatment is provided for Russian exports of agricultural, metallurgical, and chemical products. Under the FTA, Indonesia will eliminate duties on 90% of Russian exports. By using these FTAs, Russia is strengthening not only its economic position but also its political standing in key regions—the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. This is particularly significant given the fragmentation of the global economy, the formation of the Eurasian Economic Space, and the eastward pivot of Russian foreign economic policy. The agreement with Iran is of special importance for the EAEU as a whole and for Russia as a member, since Iran is not a WTO member. The FTA with Iran is the only document regulating trade and overall economic relations between the partners.
In addition to the three agreements already concluded, negotiations are under way with two more BRICS countries—Egypt and India—to sign further FTAs. These will also be significant. The FTA with Egypt will facilitate an increase in Russian exports of agricultural products and other goods, such as railway cars, vehicles, and other items. Cooperation in the energy, pharmaceutical, and transport sectors is also expected to develop. Egypt, as an active participant in the African Continental Free Trade Area, will serve as an additional link between the EAEU and African countries. Access to the Suez Canal will provide further impetus for the development of transport and logistics infrastructure in the region.
The EAEU's Free Trade Agreement with India's growing economy will intensify cooperation in agriculture, high‑tech industries, electronics, and textiles, and holds great promise in many other areas.
In addition to FTAs already being implemented with the five BRICS countries mentioned above, there is a strong chance that negotiations will be initiated with three other members: Ethiopia, South Africa, and Brazil. Ethiopia's accession to the WTO was discussed at the WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference, held in March 2026. Negotiations are in their final stages, and it is likely that Ethiopia will become a full WTO member in 2026–2027. This would facilitate the launch of negotiations on signing an FTA with the EAEU. For South Africa, there are no particular risks associated with concluding an FTA with the EAEU, as the partners' trade is highly complementary and the signing of an FTA would not lead to increased competition in their national markets. Brazil has been on the list of potential candidates for an FTA with the EAEU for some time. The situation is less predictable, however, due to Brazil's membership in MERCOSUR, comprising Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Signing an FTA in this case would require a compromise among the nine members of two regional organisations—the EAEU and MERCOSUR. By way of comparison, it took the European Union more than 18 years to negotiate a similar agreement with MERCOSUR. Only recently, in May 2026, was it finally agreed that the EU‑MERCOSUR agreement would enter into force. Nevertheless, in the medium term, eight BRICS countries could potentially sign an FTA with Russia and its EAEU partners.
As for China—another key BRICS member—any decision on an FTA will most likely be handled at the level of the EAEU as a whole. The idea of signing an FTA with China has come up many times over the years, including within APEC back when the Bogor Goals were set in 1994, and more recently in the SCO at China's own initiative. Importantly, it has now been placed on the EAEU's economic strategy agenda. China's high product competitiveness and its powerful export expansion pose challenges for trade relations with most individual nations, both developed and developing. Therefore, trade liberalisation with China is more likely to occur not at the level of any single country but rather through a group of countries—as was the case with ASEAN and as could potentially happen with the EAEU.
Thus, by actively signing bilateral FTAs with BRICS countries, Russia and its EAEU partners are effectively transforming BRICS into a platform for a growing network of bilateral free trade agreements within the group. This network, which the EAEU is actively building, could eventually encompass virtually all BRICS nations. Continuing the EAEU's policy of signing bilateral FTAs with BRICS partner countries will contribute to the growth of the group's overall trade potential.
This will help increase mutual trade among the BRICS countries, which is especially important in the context of highly turbulent international trade during economic and geopolitical crises. Experience shows that free trade agreements act as a kind of "damper" during downturns in global activity: even if trade between partners declines, it does so at a significantly slower rate compared to global trade.
Furthermore, by testing trade liberalisation agreements in a bilateral format, common approaches among the BRICS countries regarding FTAs will gradually emerge. If all BRICS members adopt this practice, the resulting "noodle bowl" of numerous bilateral free trade agreements between members will eventually necessitate the creation of common trade norms and rules within the group—in the form of general principles for regional trade, and ultimately for a common free trade area.
Russia, together with its BRICS partners, advocates for maintaining an open, transparent, fair, inclusive, equitable, and non‑discriminatory multilateral trading system. The position and influence of the BRICS nations in the WTO will be strengthened if they are linked by robust trade relations and mutual trade continues to grow. As a widely used format for organising trade, FTAs help establish an alternative legal framework for developing economic relations—especially during times of uncertainty, instability, and when the multilateral trading system is in need of reform.
The material was prepared specially for the BRICS Expert Council-Russia
This text reflects the personal opinion of the authors', which may not coincide with the position of the BRICS Expert Council-Russia