WAICO & BRICS: What Does the New Global AI Organization Mean for the Group?

On 16 July 2026, representatives of 29 countries signed an agreement in China establishing the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). The new body has been granted the status of an independent intergovernmental international organization, with its headquarters to be located in Shanghai. Its founding members include China, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, and a number of other countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Several BRICS members have therefore become part of the group of states shaping a new institutional platform for global AI governance.

The creation of WAICO demonstrates that international competition in artificial intelligence is moving beyond declarations, codes, and broad ethical principles toward the establishment of permanent institutions. Until recently, the most influential mechanisms for discussing AI were created predominantly by Western states and organizations, including the OECD, the G7, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, AI safety summits, and coalitions of countries with broadly similar political and technological approaches. These formats have contributed to the development of common principles, but the ability of Global South countries to shape their agendas has remained limited.

The response has been the gradual development of alternative approaches: promoting the agenda of fair and inclusive AI governance within the G20, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and other regional organizations; the adoption in Russia of the AI Ethics Code signed by more than 900 organizations, including over 80 foreign participants; and China’s preparation of the WAICO initiative. All these developments over recent years reflect an effort to broaden the range of states involved in shaping the rules of global AI governance.

This background has largely determined the distinctive features of the new global AI organization. WAICO is open to sovereign states regardless of their political system, does not establish prior political or value-based criteria for participation, and focuses not only on safety but also on development and reducing the global technological divide. In this sense, WAICO could become the first permanent international institution in which access to AI models, computing infrastructure, and technological capabilities is addressed alongside the regulation of risks.

Importantly, the principles of the new organization largely correspond to the approaches promoted by BRICS. WAICO’s founding documents emphasize adherence to the UN Charter – UN Secretary-General António Guterres participated in the founding ceremony – as well as extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, and human-centered AI development. These principles are broadly consistent with the 2025 BRICS Leaders’ Statement on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence. At the same time, WAICO is positioned not as a replacement for universal international mechanisms, but as an instrument for coordinating national strategies, governance approaches, and technical standards.

BRICS itself does not have a permanent secretariat or a specialized international organization capable of working continuously on AI issues, preparing projects, and supporting their implementation. If all BRICS countries eventually join WAICO, the organization could partially fill this institutional gap by providing BRICS members with an additional platform for coordinating technical approaches and advancing joint initiatives.

At the same time, BRICS is only one of several dimensions of China’s international AI policy. At the opening of the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC), Chinese President Xi Jinping announced plans to develop applied cooperation centers with ASEAN, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. WAICO is therefore emerging as an institution designed for a much broader framework of cooperation with the Global South. This, however, does not contradict the BRICS model, which itself remains open to engagement with many of the same regional organizations.

The composition of WAICO’s founding members nevertheless shows that there is not yet a unified position within BRICS toward the new organization. India, which holds the BRICS presidency this year, was not listed among the signatories to the agreement. The world’s most populous country is itself highly active in this field. In February 2026, New Delhi hosted the AI Impact Summit, the first major global forum of its kind to be held in a Global South country. More than 90 countries supported the summit’s final declaration, which endorsed the principle of “AI for All.” This suggests that a platform-based format, rather than a formal organization, may in some cases prove more viable for bringing together the full range of Global South countries.

Why, then, was China the country that initiated the creation of a new institution for global AI governance? And what does this mean for BRICS?

First, the practical significance of China’s initiative rests on the combination of two key elements: advanced computing infrastructure and the active promotion of open AI models. It is perhaps no coincidence that on the first day of the conference, Moonshot AI introduced Kimi K3, described as the world’s largest open-source model. Together with Qwen, DeepSeek, and Z.ai, it forms part of China’s rapidly expanding ecosystem of open AI models. For BRICS countries, access to advanced algorithms and the ability to deploy AI solutions on their own servers are particularly valuable because they allow states to retain control over data and adapt models to national languages. In the longer term, cooperation in hardware will also become critical. Access to advanced Chinese chips could provide a genuine alternative to US technologies and significantly strengthen the computing sovereignty of BRICS countries.

Second, the scale of China’s domestic market gives Beijing considerable leverage over major American technology companies. A clear example is Apple’s planned use of Alibaba’s Qwen model and Baidu technologies to launch Apple Intelligence in China. Beijing is able to impose its own conditions on the world’s largest technology corporations, including requirements related to localization and the integration of AI services. At the same time, the broader trend toward stronger national control over digital infrastructure is also visible across other BRICS countries. Governments are increasingly requiring major AI companies to localize data and comply with national regulatory requirements, making the idea of a common organization for AI governance particularly relevant.

Third, the speed with which Beijing develops regulatory frameworks in response to emerging technological challenges deserves particular attention. For example, updated rules for AI companion services in China entered into force on 15 July. Platforms are now required to prevent the formation of emotional dependency and introduce additional safeguards for minors. In this area, China is effectively moving ahead of many other countries by introducing solutions to risks that are only beginning to be debated in other jurisdictions. Such regulatory experience could become an important contribution to the work of the new organization.

 

Of course, a certain degree of asymmetry within WAICO will be inevitable at the initial stage. The organization was created on a Chinese initiative, its headquarters are located in Shanghai, and China possesses larger AI models, stronger technology companies, and more extensive computing infrastructure than most of the other participating states. However, this should be viewed not only as a risk of increasing Chinese influence, but also as an initial structural condition that can be balanced as the organization develops. After all, the fact that the United Nations headquarters is located in New York does not make the UN a pro-American organization. What is therefore needed are transparent governance rules, balanced representation of participating states in governing bodies, rotation of leadership positions, and joint determination of research and technological priorities.

The establishment of WAICO does not in itself guarantee the emergence of an alternative global order in artificial intelligence. Unfortunately, any real “order” in this field is not yet even visible on the horizon. We are currently at a stage of intense competition for leadership in AI and a broader restructuring of the international system. Precisely for this reason, BRICS countries should make use of every effective format that can help reduce technological inequality and strengthen their capacity to participate in shaping the future global AI landscape.