Does the BRICS-ASEAN Dialogue Have a Future?

The Russia–ASEAN anniversary Summit in Kazan (June 17–18, 2026) produced a number of notable political signals, yet one formulation, all but lost in the overall volume, may become a subject of separate discussion in the coming years.

This in itself seems logical against the backdrop of the growing role of Global South countries and the expansion of BRICS, including through ASEAN member states. Certain prerequisites for such a dialogue have already been established. Indonesia is a member of BRICS, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have recently been granted partner-state status. This fact inevitably prompts speculation about whether the next step could be the development of a dialogue and gradual institutionalization of engagement between the two platforms.

First, it is not entirely clear what format such cooperation might take. ASEAN is a highly institutionalized regional grouping featuring a permanent secretariat, an extensive system of sectoral mechanisms, annual summits, and a well-structured architecture for engagement with external partners. Over the decades, the Association has consistently built a network of dialogue partnerships encompassing leading global powers and international organizations.

BRICS is structured quite differently. It is neither an international organization in the classical sense nor an integration bloc with a unified administrative apparatus. Rather, it is a flexible platform for dialogue that evolves through a network of working groups, ministerial meetings, and summits—and, moreover, one that is truly global rather than regional in scope.

Second, the legal framework governing ASEAN’s relations with its partners is not always fleshed out with concrete substance in practice. One need only look at the interaction between ASEAN and the SCO. Despite the existence of a memorandum of understanding and regular contact between their respective secretariats, cooperation is largely limited to information sharing, mutual participation in events, and symbolic statements expressing a readiness to expand ties.

While this serves as a useful mechanism for maintaining political dialogue, it can hardly be described as an instrument for implementing major joint projects or initiatives. Therefore, the inclusion of a provision in the Russia-ASEAN Plan of Action regarding the exploration of cooperation prospects between ASEAN and BRICS does not guarantee that such work will actually get underway in the coming years.

Third, the inclusion of ASEAN member states in BRICS does not automatically result in the emergence of a unified "ASEAN voice" within the bloc. Such an assumption runs counter to the very logic of the organization's member states' foreign policies.

Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand may adopt opposing stances on virtually any international issue involving their national interests or matters of particular sensitivity. Indonesia’s entry into BRICS—or the participation of other regional countries in the BRICS Plus format—expands their foreign policy toolkit but does not transform them into ambassadors for the Association within BRICS. On the contrary, by utilizing the BRICS platform, Southeast Asian states will primarily advance their own economic and diplomatic interests, which do not always align with the collective ASEAN agenda.

Fourth, key BRICS nations (Russia, China, and India) have long maintained their own established frameworks for engagement with ASEAN, serving as full-fledged dialogue partners of the Association. A wide range of sectoral mechanisms operates with each of them, covering areas such as trade, investment, transport, the digital economy, energy, education, and security. It is precisely through these bilateral institutional channels that the majority of joint projects are currently implemented.

As yet, no convincing answer to this question has emerged from either ASEAN or the BRICS countries.

Fifth, the general logic of ASEAN’s own foreign policy is equally revealing. Pragmatism regarding the choice of partners and international cooperation frameworks is embedded in the organization’s DNA. While political symbolism matters, concrete benefits—both economic and strategic—take center stage.

Above all, the focus is on attracting investment and technology, as well as securing new opportunities to develop national economies and boost their competitiveness on the global stage. If a specific partner or framework helps achieve these goals, ASEAN will actively engage. If there is no clear economic payoff, however, ASEAN quickly loses interest, and the interaction—at best—devolves into mere ceremonial gatherings.

In this regard, BRICS does not yet create qualitatively new opportunities for ASEAN. True, discussions are underway within the group concerning the expansion of settlements in national currencies and the enhancement of resilience in the energy and agricultural sectors. However, most of these initiatives are being implemented either between individual states or through specialized institutions, rather than under the auspices of BRICS.

A second key priority for ASEAN in its engagement with external partners is elevating the bloc's status and reinforcing its central role within the regional architecture. The Association seeks to act as the primary driving force in dialogue with external powers, regardless of their political weight or level of economic development. For this reason, ASEAN attaches paramount importance to its own forums, even when they generate more controversy and media hype than substantive outcomes.

In this instance, it is not entirely clear how a dialogue with BRICS could further strengthen ASEAN’s own position. If anything, the reverse is true: BRICS is currently at a stage of development where securing the Association’s support would be beneficial. For all the shortcomings and crises that have been the subject of discussion for years, ASEAN operates on a completely different level than BRICS in terms of institutional maturity, global recognition, and its standing as an international platform.

This, however, doesn’t mean there are no prospects for collaboration at all. Overly high expectations can easily lead to disappointment, but taking a realistic approach, we can identify several areas where limited cooperation is quite feasible.

There is no need to create new complex institutional frameworks. It would suffice to organize expert consultations, joint research, thematic conferences, or dialogue between relevant ministries.

Beyond that, some potential remains in engagement between think tanks, universities, and business communities of ASEAN and BRICS.

Ultimately, the question of a bureaucratic cooperation model is secondary. Given sufficient political will, states are capable of finding a wide range of organizational solutions regardless of the legal status of particular groupings. A more important question is why ASEAN needs a separate engagement with BRICS. That question, however, remains open. 

The inclusion of a relevant provision in the Plan of Action should be seen primarily as a friendly signal rather than evidence of an imminent new cooperation architecture. Besides, ambitious language of this kind is fairly typical for anniversary summits. The key is not to become hostage to documents and not to mistake aspirations for reality.

Another important circumstance should not be overlooked. The initiative to explore prospects for cooperation between the Association and BRICS originated in the Russia–ASEAN Plan of Action, not in BRICS documents or as an outcome of an ASEAN Summit. Moscow by definition cannot speak on behalf of the entire bloc or assume responsibility for it, at least outside of its own chairmanship. For its part, Russia can well initiate such a dialogue, but the bigger question is to what extent this is of interest and importance to other BRICS member states, especially the new ones. 

In its updated form, BRICS is still like a child who has yet to learn to walk, speak a diplomatic language that everyone understands, and step into the adult world. A potential dialogue with ASEAN or any other established organization is not an end in itself; rather, it is a test of whether BRICS is ready, in principle, to move beyond discussing its internal agenda and become a partner for other international groupings.