Global Governance in Crisis: The Role of the Global South, BRICS, and India

Global Governance in Crisis: The Role of the Global South, BRICS, and India

9 June 2026

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Global Governance in Crisis: The Role of the Global South, BRICS, and India

The global order is clearly in transition. Institutions of global political and economic governance are struggling to deliver. Institutions like the UN Security Council, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and even the Word Health Organisation (WHO) are marked by dysfunction and limited effectiveness. Although many of the economic decisions are still being debated within forums such as the G7 and OECD, these institutions no longer have the capacity to effectively implement or deliver on them.

Many in the Global South have been articulating this reality for quite some time. What is notable now is that leaders of major Western powers have also begun to openly acknowledge the same shift. The Munich Security Report 2026 argued that the world has entered an era of "wrecking-ball politics." It identified Donald Trump as a central figure in this transformation, portraying him as a leading force challenging established rules, norms, and institutions. Washington’s imposition of sweeping tariffs in 2025, widely regarded as inconsistent with WTO rules, marked a significant departure from established global trade norms. The subsequent proliferation of bilateral trade agreements with the United States underscores the broader systemic rupture affecting the multilateral trading system. 

At the 2026 Munich Security Conference, several leaders argued that the post-1945 world order had effectively come to an end. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that "the world order as it has stood for decades no longer exists." French President Emmanuel Macron echoed this sentiment at the World Economic Forum in Davos, arguing that the world is moving towards an era marked by the absence of effective collective governance.

Subsequently, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared at the EU Ambassadors Conference in Brussels that "Europe can no longer be a custodian of the old world order, of a world that has gone and will not return." U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed a similar view at Munich, arguing that the world has entered a new geopolitical phase and that the old international order has effectively ended. According to Rubio, many have also concluded that the era of uncontested Western dominance is over. He called for stronger alliances with countries that take pride in their culture and heritage, recognize a shared civilizational legacy with the United States, and are prepared to defend it. Emphasizing that America would not passively manage what he described as the West’s gradual decline, Rubio advocated the renewal of what he considers the greatest civilization in history.

 

Views from the Global South

While the United States may be looking to build what Rubio called "a new western century"— which a declining Europe might applaud — the world has already changed fundamentally. Power is no longer concentrated in a single civilizational or geopolitical bloc. For India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, the international system is evolving toward greater multipolarity, characterized by an increasing number of autonomous and self-confident centres of decision-making.

 In contrast to the rupture in the western dominated governance system, the Global South has transformed and is no longer what it once was. It now carries substantial weight economically, politically, strategically, technologically, and intellectually. Over the past two decades, while the North has faced repeated crises—such as the sub-prime collapse and the Eurozone crisis—the Global South has been resurgent. From contributing just 17% of global income in the 1970s, the economies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America now account for over 40%. Nearly 65% of global inward investment flows to the South, and about one-third of global outward investment originates there—up from just 5% in the 1990s. South–South trade now exceeds $6 trillion. Beyond trade and finance, the South is also emerging as a leader in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and financial inclusion. Global South is leading many connectivity initiatives and can play very significant role in shaping global development architecture.

Platforms such as the G20, BRICS, the SCO, IBSA, the African Union, and various Latin American institutions are providing the Global South with greater representation and influence in global affairs. The weaponization of financial systems by the United States and Europe has further underscored the urgency of reform. Sanctions imposed on Russia, Iran, and Venezuela have led many countries in the Global South to recognize that similar measures could one day be directed against them, thereby accelerating efforts to rethink and reform the existing international order.

Recent geopolitical developments have reinforced these concerns. U.S. interventions in Venezuela and the U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran have heightened strategic anxieties across the Global South. These developments have not only raised questions about sovereignty and the use of force but have also generated significant economic concerns, particularly regarding energy security, trade disruptions, and the stability of global markets. As a result, calls for a more inclusive, equitable, and multipolar international order have gained further momentum.

 

Advancing Economic and Financial Integration in BRICS 

To a large extent, a multipolar world has already arrived, with the non-Western majority poised to shape many of the key global developments in the years ahead. Elements of this emerging reality are increasingly visible in forums such as BRICS. Although BRICS began as a primarily economic grouping, it has the potential to evolve into a major political, economic, and demographic force. Despite contemporary challenges—including sanctions against Russia and Iran, the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, and difficulties in India-China relations—it is likely to remain one of the most influential global groupings because of the combined economic weight, demographic scale, and political influence of its members.

BRICS has already established important institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Coordinated action by BRICS countries could make a significant contribution to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. The expansion of the grouping in 2025 reflects its growing attractiveness and relevance in an evolving international order. Additional countries are likely to join in the coming years.

As more influential non-Western countries join the grouping, BRICS could gradually emerge as an important alternative platform in global governance, particularly in specific economic and financial domains. While it is unlikely to replace existing international institutions in the foreseeable future, it has the potential to provide complementary mechanisms and greater representation for the interests and priorities of the Global South.

As BRICS consists of many dynamically growing economies, there are plenty of new opportunities for the BRICS countries to deepen their economic ties. The last major expansion of the grouping was clearly energy centric and West Asia centric. The grouping consists of major energy producers and consumers. Many countries including India, China, Russia, Iran, and the UAE are already doing most of their energy transactions in local currencies. At the moment, most of these transactions are bilateral. The creation of a single BRICS currency is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future. However, BRICS countries may need to develop a common alternative payment mechanism based on their national currencies, at least for trade in key commodities such as energy. Instead of working bilateral mechanisms, a common BRICS mechanism will be useful. If successful, it can be used by other developing countries as well. This can also give direction for some future trade agreement among BRICS nations. BRICS nations now also play an important role in international development cooperation activities. Still there is no real attempt to put together an alternative BRICS development strategy.  The real South-South Cooperation and BRICS solidarity could be demonstrated through common action in third countries. In the coming years, BRICS may help strengthen multipolarity and  may provide some of the answers to current global economic governance flaws.

 

India’s Priorities

As the Global South is poised to become a major force in the emerging world order, India is seeking to position itself as its voice through various initiatives such as the Voice of the Global South Summits, the International Solar Alliance (ISA), the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), the Global Biofuels Alliance (GBA), and DAKSHIN–Global South Centre of Excellence, among others. In the context of emerging global changes, India’s key priority is to foster the emergence of a new multilateral order that upholds peace and promotes sustainable development. This is reflected in India’s 2026 BRICS presidency theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability". 

Despite an ambitious start, however, India’s BRICS presidency has remained relatively low-key so far. This has coincided with growing difficulties in India–US relations. Under these circumstances, New Delhi is unlikely to champion far-reaching BRICS initiatives that could further irritate Washington, particularly given President Trump’s sceptical view of the grouping and his perception of BRICS as a challenge to US economic and strategic interests. The West Asian crisis has added another layer of complexity. The US-Israeli military action against Iran—an important BRICS member—and the subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes against the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both fellow BRICS members, have generated fresh political and diplomatic challenges for India’s BRICS presidency.

Beyond the immediate concerns of sustaining the ceasefire and ensuring the uninterrupted flow of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, any broader geopolitical realignment in West Asia is likely to unfold gradually. As India seeks to position itself as a leading voice of the Global South, including through its BRICS presidency, it will need to engage actively with West Asia’s evolving security and economic architecture. Beyond trade, energy, and diaspora ties, the success of key connectivity initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) will depend on regional stability. Iran and the United States maintain fundamentally opposing perceptions of each other’s role in the region, rooted in deep strategic mistrust and conflicting visions of regional order. Therefore, even if an agreement on immediate issues is reached, a prolonged process of negotiations over the broader regional order is likely to continue. This is where India can play an important role. With its civilisational linkages, economic and military weight, and leadership of the Global South, New Delhi has the potential to emerge as one of the leading players in West Asia.

India must therefore manage its relations with Iran, the GCC countries, and Israel with considerable tact, while keeping the region’s evolving strategic order firmly in view. Although achieving consensus within BRICS remains challenging, New Delhi can still use its position as Chair to shape the agenda through clear and purposeful messaging. While the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 2026 concluded without a joint statement—largely due to differences between Iran and the UAE over the West Asia conflict—there remains a reasonable prospect that the Leaders’ Summit in September will produce a consensus communiqué. After all, during India’s G20 Presidency in 2023, Indian negotiators successfully secured a consensus declaration despite deep divisions over the Ukraine war.

The material was prepared specially for the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

This text reflects the personal opinion of the authors', which may not coincide with the position of the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

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